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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The size of government deﬁcits and the time path of debt are of central importance in the political
discussions that shape economic policies in OECD countries. For example, in the US active ﬁscal
policymaking has been limited by frequent disputes between the President and the Congress over
the constitutional balance budget amendment. In Europe, the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) has been a topic of intense debates in the last few years. In the past, membership
to the EMU strongly depended on deﬁcit policies, but initially virtuous countries such as France,
Germany, and the Netherlands have joined ranks with initially less virtuous ones like Italy, Portugal
and Greece in passing the upper bound set for the deﬁcit to GDP ratio. Furthermore, in some
of these countries, the net-of-interest debt to GDP ratio started growing again after the decline
of the late 1990’s. The implications of ﬁscal policy decisions for the maintenance of monetary
stability have attracted the attention of central bankers and academics have started investigating
how exuberant ﬁscal policy may aﬀect local and union wide prices (see e.g. Canova and Pappa
(2003)).
Restrictions on ﬁscal policy actions have been criticized on a number of grounds. Critics often
stress that ﬁscal constraints limit the ability of governments to react to ﬂuctuations in the local
economy. Two undesirable consequences may result. First, since government capability to stabilize
the economy is reduced, the volatility of macrovariables could be increased. Second, since expendi-
tures must follow the revenue cycle, budget restrictions may make expenditure procyclical. Hence,
tight budget constraints may amplify ﬂuctuations, turning slowdowns into deep recessions.
Despite the popular appeal of this argument, Canzoneri, Diba and Cumby (2002) suggest that
ﬁscal policy in the US and Europe has hardly focused on macroeconomic stabilization over the last
two decades. Two complementary reasons may account for this. First, given the lags in the leg-
islative process, discretionary ﬁscal policy may be unable to counteract business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Second, since automatic stabilizers are roughly given at business cycle frequencies, and since their
share in total expenditure is typically large, also the non-discretionary component of expenditure
cannot vary substantially over the cycles. Hence, limiting ﬁscal actions cannot dramatically alter
the magnitude and the shape of cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Supporters of ﬁscal restrictions, on the other hand, suggest that the medium term beneﬁts of
limiting government actions dominate the short run costs incurred by the inability of ﬁscal policy
to react to business cycle conditions (see e.g. Diaz Gimenez, et al. (2003), Andres and Domenec1 INTRODUCTION 3
(2002)). This argument is usually based on two principles. First, by limiting the ability of govern-
ments to run politically motivated deﬁcits and unsustainable levels of debt, ﬁscal constraints make
governments more credible, reduce the suboptimality of political games, and induce a smoother
path for taxes, which is the optimal policy to follow in a number of theoretical models (see e.g.
Alesina and Perotti (1996)). Second, since ﬂuctuations in expenditure may have been themselves
a source of undesirable ﬂuctuations, restraining ﬁscal policy may actually stabilize the economy.
As for the ﬁrst principle, the literature has made an important distinction between ﬂexible rules,
which allow for some sensitivity of deﬁcit and debt to economic conditions, or apply to consumption
but not to investment and infrastructure expenditures, and strict ones. On the other hand, the
evidence on the contribution of ﬁscal shocks to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations is contradictory. Stan-
dard dynamic general equilibrium models of ﬁscal policy (see e.g. King and Baxter (1993), Duarte
and Wolman (2002), or Gali, Lopez Salido and Valles (2003)) have hard time to produce sizable
ﬂuctuations in response to ﬁscal disturbances in closed economy models calibrated to match salient
features of OECD business cycles. Empirically, Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Canova and Pappa
(2003), and Perotti (2004) have shown that expenditure shocks can at times produce economically
signiﬁcant output and employment multipliers.
Critics and supporters of ﬁscal constraints however do agree on one fact: deﬁcits and debts have
distributional eﬀects which may have long lasting repercussions. Borrowing, for example, reduces
resources available to future generations and, if it is used to ﬁnance consumption, it may induce
a misallocation of resources. Therefore, the design of ﬁscal restrictions must carefully balance
incentives and constraints and include intratemporal and intertemporal considerations.
While there is evidence that ﬁscal restraints have provided some safeguard against the misuse
of public funds (see e.g. Poterba (1994) and Bohn and Inman (1996); Von Hagen (1990) has an
opposite view), very little is known about the macroeconomic consequences of imposing ﬁscal con-
straints. Gali (1994), Gali and Perotti (2003), Fatas and Mihov (2003), Lane (2003) and Sorensen,
Wu and Yosha (2001) have examined some aspects of the relationship between ﬁscal variables and
the macroeconomy, but to the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has simultaneously studied
whether ﬁscal constraints alter (i) the business cycle features of macroeconomic variables, (ii) the
transmission properties of ﬁscal shocks and (iii) the ﬁscal rules that governments follow. We can
think of several reasons for why the literature is silent on these questions. First, it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd case studies where tight ﬁscal constraints have been imposed in countries which originally had
no ﬁscal restrictions. Second, over the cross section, countries which have loose deﬁcit restrictions1 INTRODUCTION 4
typically have tighter debt constraints. Third, ﬁscal disturbances are diﬃcult to identify since the
systematic and the unsystematic component of policy are highly intertwined and ”surprises” may
induce macroeconomic changes before they are implemented. Fourth, ﬁscal rules may be subject
to predictable changes at election times, or at times of political turmoil. Last, but not least, cross
country data is typically short and hard to obtain at the quarterly frequency.
This paper studies how ﬁscal constraints aﬀect the macroeconomy using data from 48 US states
for the sample 1969-1995. First, we examine whether ﬁscal constraints alter the volatility and
the comovements of state macroeconomic variables, grouping states with a number of indicators
capturing diﬀerent aspects of existing ﬁscal restrictions. Second, we examine the transmission
properties of two types of government expenditure disturbances (one ﬁnanced by debt and one
by distortionary taxation) for a typical state with loose, or strict ﬁscal restrictions. Finally, we
back out the typical expenditure rules (one for each type of shock) for states with diﬀerent ﬁscal
restrictions and compare them. We use both asymptotic and small sample tests to measure the
statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in the statistics across groups and corroborate the analysis
by evaluating the economic consequences of the diﬀerences we found.
Why use US states to assess the macroeconomic consequences of ﬁscal constraints? There
are many reasons for our choice. First, the cross section of US states is rich enough to include
cases where rules are strict, others where they are somewhat loose and one case where no ﬁscal
restrictions are in place (e.g. Vermont). Second, there is one state (Tennessee) where the nature of
ﬁscal restrictions changed from loose to tight within the sample. Third, the available data covers a
suﬃciently long span of time (27 years), including both expansionary and recessionary periods, and
a comparable data set for OECD countries is not available. Finally, deﬁcit and debt constraints
in US states typically exclude capital expenditure. Therefore, they fall within the class of ﬂexible
rules which academics and policymakers consider desirable.
We ﬁnd that the macroeconomic consequences of ﬁscal constraints have been overemphasized.
While point estimates and, at times, the sign of the statistics we compute for states with strict
ﬁscal constraints diﬀer from those of states with loose ﬁscal constraints, diﬀerences are statistically
insigniﬁcant and, often, economically unimportant. This result holds regardless of how we deﬁne
”loose”, or ”strict”, of whether deﬁcit, debt, or institutional constraints are examined, of the type
of statistical tests we employ and, to a large extent, the statistics and the sample we consider.
For example, standard second moments that the literature has used to characterize business cycle
ﬂuctuations are similar in states with loose and strict restrictions. Furthermore, ﬁscal restrictions1 INTRODUCTION 5
have little impact both qualitatively and quantitatively on how ﬁscal disturbances are transmitted to
the real economy. Finally, ﬁscal restrictions may not necessarily alter the ability of the government
to respond to the state of the economy and only marginally explain the diﬀerences in ﬁscal rules
across US states.
Why is it that ﬁscal constraints appear to make so little macroeconomic diﬀerence? We show
that the main reason is the ability of state governments to work around the rules and transfer ex-
penditure items to either less restricted accounts, or to less constrained portions of the government.
In addition, the presence of rainy days funds, which are available to all state governments by the
end of the sample, eﬀectively allows to limit current expenditure cuts at times when the constraints
become binding. Given that constraints apply only to a portion of the total budget, that no formal
provision for the enforcement of the constraints exists and that rainy days funds play a buﬀer-stock
role, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that tight ﬁscal constraints do not statistically alter the magnitude
and the nature of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
Our results have important implications for the design of ﬁscal restrictions. If constraints are
imposed to keep government behavior under control, tight restrictions may be the wrong way to go,
since they simply imply more creative accounting practices, unless they come together with clearly
stated and easily veriﬁable enforcement requirements. That is to say, tight ﬁscal constraints are
neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition for good government performance. On the other hand,
if constraints are imposed to reduce default probabilities, or to limit the eﬀects that local spending
has on average area wide inﬂation, and given that their negative macroeconomic eﬀects appear to
be marginal, tight constraints with some carefully selected escape route could be preferable.
Is there a lesson to be learned from the results for the reform of the SGP? While Canova
and Pappa (2003) have shown that the response of macroeconomic variables to ﬁscal shocks in
the two monetary unions share a number of important similarities, care should be exercised to
use our evidence for that purpose. There are at least three reasons which make most of our
conclusions dubious in a European environment. First, US state labor markets are suﬃciently
ﬂexible, people move across states and other margins (such as relative prices) quickly adjust to
absorb macroeconomic shocks. Europe is diﬀerent in this respect and the imposition of tighter ﬁscal
restrictions in the EMU may have completely diﬀerent eﬀects. Second, since ﬁscal constraints in the
US almost always exclude capital account expenditures, the conclusions we reach are not necessarily
applicable to situations where non-golden rule type of constraints are in place. Third, social security,
medical and welfare expenditures constitute the largest portion of current account expenditure of2 THE MODEL AND THE METHODOLOGY 6
European countries, while they are a tiny portion of expenditure of US states (less than four
percent). Given that such expenditures are inﬂexible and, to a large extent, acyclical, direct
extension of our conclusions to the European arena should be avoided. Nevertheless, we would like
to stress that, while the presence of strict ﬁscal constraints does not make an important diﬀerence
for cyclical ﬂuctuations, some ﬁscal restriction is present in all but one US states. Therefore, none
of our conclusions implies the abandonment of some kind of legislated ﬁscal restraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical model,
explains our methodology and compares it with those typically used in the literature. Section 3
presents the procedure used to identify ﬁscal shocks and to construct ﬁscal rules. Section 4 describes
how indicators capturing deﬁcit and debt restrictions are constructed. Section 5 presents the results
and section 6 compares our results to the existing literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model and the methodology
The results presented in this paper are primarily obtained using VARs. While unconditional volatil-
ities and correlations can be obtained without a VAR, we use such a model also for these statistics
to unify our empirical analysis.
We have gathered annual data for 48 US states (DC, Alaska and Hawaii are excluded) for
the period 1969 to 19951. The relative shortness of the data prevents us not only to study the
transmission of shocks across states but also the estimation of a model which simultaneously includes
a number of state and union wide variables. Given these limitations, we are forced to neglect
possible neighborhood eﬀects and choose, for each unit, ﬁve endogenous variables, four exogenous
variables and a constant. The endogenous variables are: the log of the state to the union wide
price level; the log of the state to the union wide real per-capita output; the log of the state to
the union wide employment level; the log of state real government revenues and the log of state
real government consumption expenditure, both in per-capita terms and deﬂated by state prices.
Scaling state variables by their union wide level catches two birds with one stone: it transforms
trending variables into stationary ones; and it allows to directly control for ﬂuctuations which are
aggregate in nature. Note that our scaling does not exclude the possibility that aggregate US
cycles have a spatial dimension, nor the possibility that time series have infrequent mean shifts
1The data stop in 1995, since there is no data on state CPI prices thereafter. We have used an alternative
speciﬁcation where state CPI prices were substituted with state implicit price deﬂator data, which are available from
1985-2003. We have selected the 1969-95 sample because it is longer and potentially more interesting.2 THE MODEL AND THE METHODOLOGY 7
so long as they are shared by the aggregate variables. Note also that we use total state and local
expenditure in the analysis to take into account possible oﬀ-budget activities where expenditures
are shifted to less restricted part of the government whenever constraints become binding. The
exogenous variables we employ are the area-wide nominal interest rate, the level of oil prices, the
Federal aid to the states and the state debt to output ratio. The ﬁrst three variables are used
to control for aggregate area-wide supply and demand eﬀects; local debt enters the speciﬁcation
following the suggestions of the ﬁscal theory of the price level (see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2001)
for a survey), and the work of Canova and Pappa (2003). State debt includes both guaranteed and
non-guaranteed debt, to capture possible substitution eﬀects induced by debt limits. The sources
of the data and the deﬁnition of the variables are in the appendix. The Schwarz criteria indicates
that one lag of the endogenous variable suﬃces to capture the dynamics and exogenous variables
enter only contemporaneously in the system, except for debt, which enters with one lag 2.
The literature has typically employed a two-stage strategy to analyze the eﬀects that unit
speciﬁc characteristics have on the dynamics of government ﬁnances, on the probability of (large)
deﬁcits and, in general, on the relationship between government expenditure and macroeconomic
activity. In the ﬁrst stage the time series dimension is employed to extract the information on
relevant parameters and, in the second stage, the cross sectional dimension is used to explain
the heterogeneity in estimated parameters using unit speciﬁc political, institutional, or economic
characteristics. For example, Bohn and Inman (1996) run a static ﬁrst stage time series regression
of the type yit =  i + αxit + eit for each state, where eit ∼ (0,σ2
i), yit is the state surplus and
xit a vector of macrovariables including output, employment, etc., and then run a cross sectional
regression ˆ  i = ziγ + vi where zi are observable state characteristics. Sorensen, Wu and Yosha
(2001), Lane (2003) and Fatas and Mihov (2003), on the other hand, run a ﬁrst stage regression
of the type yit =  i + αi∆xit + eit where yit is the budget surplus, the expenditure to output
ratio, the revenue to output ratio, or transformations of them, ∆xit includes contemporaneous, or
contemporaneous and lagged macroeconomic variables and then attempt to explain diﬀerences in
ˆ αi (or in ˆ σi) with cross sectional regressions of the type ˆ αi = z1iγ + vi,o rˆ σi = σ0 + z2iδ + vi,
where z1i could be diﬀerent than z2i. While popular, these two-stage procedures produce incorrect
estimates of γ,o rδ. In addition, it is hard to predict the direction of bias without knowing exactly
2We have examined variants of the model using e.g, revenues and expenditures measured in percentage of Gross
State Product (GSP); GSP per-capita and employment not scaled by union wide averages and state variables in
growth rates (but not per-capita terms). We have also run a model where instead of ﬁscal variables we use the
residual of a preliminary regression of these variables on either union wide variables or the variables of the region
where the state is located. The results we present are qualitatively invariant to all of these changes.2 THE MODEL AND THE METHODOLOGY 8
what is the data generating process of the cross sectional dimension of the panel.
Intuitively, there are three problems. First, speciﬁcations like those of Bohn and Inman (1996)
neglect slope heterogeneity: αi may be diﬀerent from αj if unit i and j regressors are correlated
with individual characteristics (which is likely to be the case if, e.g., xit includes output and zi labor
market, or other national regulations). Neglecting slope heterogeneities produces biased and incon-
sistent estimates of α and, given the structure of the resulting error term, an instrumental variable
(IV) approach is unlikely to solve the inconsistency problem (see e.g. Pesaran and Smith (1995)).
Second, speciﬁcations which allow for slope heterogeneities but exclude lagged dependent variables,
like Sorensen, Wu, Yosha (2001), or Lane (2003), omit regressors which are, by construction, corre-
lated with the included ones whenever ∆xit is serially correlated. Lagged dependent variables are
likely to be important in the ﬁrst stage regression because all ﬁscal variables are serial correlated.
Omission of lags of the left hand side variable produces biased and inconsistent estimates of the
ﬁrst stage parameters and therefore renders second stage regression uninterpretable. Also in this
case, an IV approach is unlikely to work since it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd instruments which eﬀectively
break the correlation between the regressors and the errors. Third, even when slope heterogeneity is
accounted for and lagged dependent variables are included in the ﬁrst stage regression (as in Fatas
and Mihov (2003)), second stage estimates neglect the fact that b αi (or b σi) have been estimated.
Hence, estimates of γ (δ)m a yb es i g n i ﬁcant even when the ”true” eﬀect is negligible.
To illustrate these problems consider the model
yit = x0it i + x1itαi + eit (1)
αi = x2iγ + vi (2)
where i =1 ,2,...,N, x1it is a 1 × K2 vector of exogenous and lagged dependent variables, x2i
is a K2 × K3 vector of time invariant unit speciﬁc characteristics, x0it is a 1 × K1 vector of unit
speciﬁc variables (possibly depending on t)a n dγ is a K3 × 1 vector of parameters. We assume
that E(x1iteit)=E(x2ivi)=0t h a teit ∼ N(0,σ2
i); that E(eit,e i0τ)=0∀ t 6= τ and i 6= i0;a n d
vi ∼ N(0,Σv). Stacking the observations for each i and using (2) into (1) we get yi = x0i i+Xiγ+ i
where Xi = x1ix2i is a T × k3 matrix, and  i = x1ivi + ei so that var( i)=x1iΣvx0
1i + σ2
iI ≡ Σ i.
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weighted average of the ﬁrst stage estimates ˆ αi with weights given by Pi.









v ˆ αi). Therefore, γ2step incorrectly measures the eﬀect of x2i on αi for two reasons. First,
suppose that xi0t =0 , ∀t. Then the term σ−2(x0
1ix1i) is missing from the formulas of γ2step and




v x2i)0.5. This means that, while the weights used in γ2step depend
on Σv,t h o s ei nγML depend on Σi and on the volatility of the unit speciﬁcr e g r e s s o r sσ−2(x0
1ix1i).
Second, if xi0t 6= 0, there are additional terms in Ωi, measuring the inﬂuence that these regressors
have on ˆ αi, which are left out from γ2step. Since the standard error of γ2step is underestimated,
a two-step regression gives an overoptimistic representation of the signiﬁcance of the relationship.
Moreover, if αi is systematically larger when x1i is more volatile, a positive γ2step may be obtained
even when the true eﬀect is negative. These observations should be kept in mind when comparing
our results with those existing in the literature. In fact, our methodology takes care of all of these
problems. First, lagged dependent variables appear in the model for each state. Second, we allow
for heterogeneity in regression coeﬃcients and in the variances across units. Third, we construct
maximum likelihood estimates of γ by plugging ˆ Σv = 1
N−1
PN
i=1(ˆ αi − 1
N
PN







iyi − yixiˆ αi)2 into the relevant formulas. Our estimators are consistent when
the number of units in each group is large (see e.g. Pesaran and Smith (1995)) and reproduce the
random coeﬃcient Bayesian estimators, when uninformative priors are used.
Since in our case x2i are dichotomous variables, implementing γML is equivalent to calculating
the ”typical” eﬀect separately in states with loose and strict restrictions. Then the equality of
the statistics across groups can be examined using asymptotic χ2-tests, or non-parametric devices
(such as a small sample rank sum test).
3 Identifying Fiscal shocks
To examine the transmission of expenditure shocks and the systematic response of expenditure
to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations we need to identify ﬁscal shocks. Such an enterprise is typically
complicated and this may explain why only a small number of studies have engaged in such an
activity (see e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher(1999), Mountford
and Uhlig (2002), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2002), Canova
and Pappa (2003), Pappa (2004), Perotti (2004)).
Three features make ﬁscal shocks diﬃcult to extract. First, ﬁscal policy is rarely unpredictable.
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These delays make standard innovation accounting problematic: agents adjust their behavior to
the new conditions when the old regime still prevails; macrovariables start moving before the shock
occurs and no surprise is measurable at the time when the policy change actually takes place. This
”non-fundamentalness” problem plagues ﬁscal shocks more than other types of policy disturbances.
Second, even when the policy stance is unchanged, expenditures and revenues move in response to
the state of the economy. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully distinguish exogenous shifts from
endogenous reactions to business cycle conditions. Third, since ﬁscal and monetary policy actions
may be related, identifying ﬁscal shocks in isolation may produce misleading results.
Our set up is designed to avoid, in principle, all these problems. First, because we consider
a monetary union, we take monetary policy as given when examining state ﬁscal policy. We do
this by imposing the exogeneity of the economy wide interest rate with respect to state variables.
Second, since all variables are endogenous in the VAR and since we control for both the state of the
local and of the aggregate business cycle, there is no need to produce cyclically adjusted estimates
of ﬁscal variables. Third, since we precisely deﬁne the type of ﬁscal disturbances we are looking
for and the timing of the responses of the endogenous variables is largely unrestricted, the non-
fundamentalness problem is also considerably eased. In particular, we seek for expenditure shocks
that produce positive comovements in states deﬁcit and in state output (G); and for expenditure
shocks that leave state deﬁcit unchanged and generate negative comovements with state output
(BB).
The ﬁrst type of expenditure shocks is the one usually encountered in macroeconomic textbooks
and dynamic RBC and New-Keynesian sticky-price models (see e.g. Baxter and King (1993),
or Pappa (2004)): an unexpected increase in spending, ﬁnanced by bond creation increases, by
deﬁnition, state deﬁcits and boosts aggregate demand and output. In identifying this type of
shocks we are agnostic about the behavior of revenues -they are allowed to stay unchanged, or
comove with expenditure as long as the correlation is not perfect - and about the timing of output
responses - they could be contemporaneous, lagged, or leading the shock. However, we assume that
over the horizon of the analysis, distorting taxes are not used to redeem government debt.
The second type of shocks are budget-balanced shocks: expansionary expenditure disturbances
are required to produce an instantaneous increase in revenues so as to leave state deﬁcits unchanged,
and to generate a fall in state output. These dynamics are standard in general equilibrium models of
ﬁscal policy. For example, Baxter and King (1993) and Ohanian (1997) showed that in a RBC type
model an increase in spending, ﬁnanced through labor taxation, temporarily decreases consumption3 IDENTIFYING FISCAL SHOCKS 11
and investment and has protracted negative output eﬀects. While the sign of the output eﬀect is
robust across models, the magnitude of the fall depends on the source of ﬁnancing (e.g. income
taxes vs. sales taxes), on the elasticity of labor and capital supply to distortionary taxes and on
whether a balance budget is imposed on a period-by-period basis, or if some ﬂexibility is allowed.
Also in this case the timing of the output eﬀect is unrestricted. Hence, anticipatory eﬀects, or future
increases in distorting taxation of the type considered by, e.g., Dotsey (1994), are not a-priori ruled
out. We summarize the identifying restrictions in table 1.
It is incorrect to classify the disturbances we extract as RBC, or Keynesian shocks. For example,
in a simple IS-LM model, balance budget shocks have unitary ﬁscal multipliers, but this occur
because lump sum taxation is used to ﬁnance the expenditure. When distorting taxes are used
the multipliers could be negative also in this case. Our preferred distinction instead focuses on the
form of ﬁnancing: debt, or lump sum taxes for G shocks, distorting taxes for BB shocks. With this
classiﬁcation RBC, and traditional, or new-Keynesian models all have the same implications as far
as output and deﬁcits are concerned.
Table 1: Identiﬁcation Restrictions
Corr(G,Y) Corr (T,Y) Corr (G, Def) Corr(T, Def) Corr(G,T)
Gs h o c k s > 0 > 0 ≥ 0 but < 1.
BB shocks < 0= 0 = 1
Clearly, we do not expect G and BB shocks to be identiﬁed in all states. In theory, G shocks
should be present only in those states which allow deﬁcit carryover and BB shocks only in states
with strict balance budget restrictions. However, balance budget legislation applies only to the
general funds and there is no enforcement mechanism insuring that rules are not bent and non-
guaranteed debt can typically be issued without popular uproar. Therefore, it is possible to have
ﬁscal disturbances that look like G shocks even in states with tight balance budget rules. Conversely,
debt restrictions may produce disturbances that look like BB shocks even in states with somewhat
loose budgetary restrictions. Finally, one can easily conceive situations where both type of shocks
could be identiﬁed in one state (e.g. if diﬀerent ﬁnancing restrictions apply to diﬀerent components
of the budget). Rather than a-priori excluding these possibilities, we let the data tell us whether
there are states which do not conform to the theoretical expectations and condition our analysis
on the results of the identiﬁcation exercise.
Since our identiﬁcation procedure, which is based on the sign of the conditional comovements of
expenditure, deﬁcit and output, diﬀers from the one typically used in the VAR literature, it is useful4 CHARACTERIZING RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 12
to spend a few words highlighting the advantages of our strategy. The existing literature typically
uses case study approaches, extraneous information, or zero restrictions on the contemporaneous
covariance matrix of VAR shocks to disentangle ﬁscal shocks from reduced form innovations. Case
studies (see e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), or Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2002)) are a
powerful way to measure the eﬀect of ﬁscal surprises if the changes are truly exogenous. As argued
in Perotti (2004), exogeneity is dubious in two of the three typically studied episodes (Korean
War, Vietnam war, Reagan buildup). The identiﬁcation restrictions we use are theory based, while
those employed in the literature are, to a large extent, conventional and hard to justify with low
frequency data like ours. For example, assuming that it takes more than a period for government
spending to respond to unexpected output movements is unappealing in annual data because of
the presence of automatic stabilizers. Since we do not use zero restrictions, typical endogeneity and
underidentiﬁcation problems are considerably eased.
To recover shocks with the required characteristics we use the methodology of Canova and
De Nicol´ o (2002). The approach starts from the eigenvalue-eigenvector orthogonalization of the
variance covariance matrix of VAR residuals and proceeds examining the responses of the endoge-
nous variables to each of the orthogonalized shocks. If we are unable to ﬁnd expenditure shocks
producing the required comovements in the variables, the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition is
multiplied by an orthonormal matrix Q(θ), where θ is a parameter, and the comovements in re-
sponse to the new set of shocks are examined. This search process continues, varying θ, or changing
the form of Q(θ)f o raﬁxed θ, until shocks with the required characteristics are found 3.
4 Characterizing restrictions on government behavior
All US states, except Vermont, face some kind of deﬁcit restrictions and the majority of them also
face debt restrictions. However, deﬁcit restrictions are at times loosely formulated; in some cases
they are ﬂexible enough to impose only weak constraints on spending behavior, and in others the
debt limit is large enough to be hardly ever binding. Finally, the enforcement of budget and debt
constraints varies across states. Hence, it is important to appropriately distinguish situations where
constraints are strict from those where they are loose.
3Q(θ) is chosen from the class of rotation matrices, where two directions are rotated at one time. The grid of
θ ∈ (0,π) includes 500 values. More details are in Canova and De Nicol´ o (2002). By rotating more than two directions
at a time, one can explore systematically the space of identiﬁcation. Given the computational burden of such an
approach and given that there are 48 states for which such a procedure needs to be run, we have only examined
primitive bivariate rotations.4 CHARACTERIZING RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 13
As far as deﬁcits are concerned, restrictions can be imposed ex-ante, or ex-post. Ex-ante restric-
tions require the governor to present, or the legislature to approve, a balance budget. Submitting,
or passing a balance budget is a weak constraint since it does not exclude the possibility that, at
the end of the year, the state will actually run a deﬁcit if revenues fall below the expected values.
When ex-ante restrictions are used, statutory, or constitutional provisions for balancing the deﬁcit
m a yb eu s e dt op r e v e n tp e r p e t u a lr o l lo v e ri n t ot h ei n ﬁnite future. Therefore, the timing for bal-
ancing the budget can also serve to induce ﬁscal discipline. With ex-post rules, the budget has to
be balanced in each ﬁscal cycle (typically one, at times two years). This means that when economic
activity falls short of expectations, state tax rates must be increased, expenditure cut, or federal
aid collected. If, despite the attempts, a deﬁcit remains it is carried over but is required to be
balanced by the end of the next year. Note that since ex-post rules apply only to the general fund,
balance budget practices may still be unrestricted if it is possible to shift items across accounts, or
funds 4. Furthermore, the presence of rainy days funds, which can be accumulated in expansions
and used to cushion unexpected shortfalls in revenues, may considerably ease the severeness of the
constraints imposed by ex-post rules.
To account for these diﬀerences, we follow Bohn and Inman (1996), and construct three indica-
tors capturing diﬀerent aspects of deﬁcit restrictions. In the ﬁrst (Ex-ante) an entry of one is given
to states where the governor must submit, or the legislature must pass a balance budget and zero
to the others. In the second (Carryover), an entry of one is given to states which may not carry
over a deﬁcit for more than a year and zero to the rest. In the third (Ex-post), a value of one is
given to states which are required to balance the budget within the current ﬁscal cycle and zero to
the others (see ﬁrst three columns of table 2). Here we do not distinguish between constitutional
and statutory restrictions since we wish to measure the eﬀects of ﬁscal constraints on state activity
and not to design institutions which more eﬀectively limit government actions.
In general, the information contained in the three indices overlaps. For example, among the
12 states with ex-ante budget restrictions, 9 are allowed to carry over deﬁcits for more than one
year. For reference, we also report in table 2 the ACIR (1987) index. This index ranks states on
the basis of the eﬀectiveness of their deﬁcit restrictions, and combines the information contained
in our three indicators using grades from 0 to 10 (with ten being the most eﬀective restrictions),
is a popular choice in the literature. However, if we dichotomize it assigning a one to states with
a grade of eight, or above and a zero to states with a grade of six, or below (as in Sorensen, Wu
4Poterba (1995) reports that in one fourth of US states, budget rules restrict less than 50% of total budget.4 CHARACTERIZING RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 14
and Yosha (2001)), it becomes perfectly collinear with the Ex-post index. Similarly, it becomes
perfectly collinear with the Ex-ante index if a grade of four is used as cut-oﬀ point.
As far as debt restrictions are concerned, constraints may refer to the total, or only to the short
run component of debt; they can be ﬁxed in nominal terms, formulated in proportion of revenues,
or the size of the states’ general fund. To capture these diﬀerences, we construct three additional
indicators. In the ﬁrst (Debt1), a value of one is entered to states with some form of debt restriction
and zero to the others. In the second (Debt2), a value of one is attributed to states which either
prohibit guaranteed (full faith and credit) debt, or allow a nominal amount below 200,000 dollars.
A zero is given to all other states. In the third (Shortdebt), a one is given to states which prohibit
short term debt and a zero to the others (see columns 5-7 in table 2).
Finally, we construct three indicators capturing political/legal characteristics which may in-
ﬂuence the state ﬁscal stance. In the ﬁrst (Veto), a value of one is given to all states where the
governor has line-item veto power on the budget and zero to the others; in the second (Court) a
value of one is given to states where the Supreme Court is elected by voters and a value of zero if
it is appointed by the Governor, or the legislature and in the third (Constitution) a one is given to
states that need a constitutional amendment to be able to borrow and zero to the others.
As suggested by Mitchell (1967), or Bohn and Inman (1996), these characteristics may aﬀect
the ﬁscal stance for the following reasons. First, since State Courts are responsible for the enforce-
ment of budget rules, it is conceivable that enforcement is less than perfect and monitoring looser
whenever Courts are appointed by those who also legislate the budget. Second, since constitutional
amendments are much harder to enact than referendums, or simple legislative actions, states with
such restrictions may face considerable constraints in their ability to issue general obligation debt.
Finally, since ﬁscally conservative voters may held Governors responsible for any marginal
expansion of state budgets, governors seeking reelection may be more active in controlling spending
and deﬁcits. One way to exercise this control is to use the veto power. Hence, as suggested by
Holtz-Eakin (1988), or Carter and Schap (1990), states where the governor has a line-item veto
power may be less prone to run a deﬁcit (see columns 8-10 of table 2).4 CHARACTERIZING RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 15
Table 2: Budget Characteristics of US states
STATEEx-ante CarryoverEx-postACIR Debt1Debt2 Short Debt VetoCourt Constitution
AL 011 10 00 1 11 1
AZ 011 10 11 1 10 1
AR 011 9 10 1 11 0
CA 100 6 00 0 11 0
CO 011 10 00 1 10 1
CT 100 5 11 0 10 0
DE 011 10 10 0 10 0
FL 011 10 00 1 10 1
GA 011 10 10 0 11 1
ID 011 10 10 0 11 0
IL 100 4 10 0 11 0
IN 011 10 11 1 00 1
IA 011 10 11 0 10 0
KS 011 10 10 0 10 0
KY 011 10 11 0 11 0
LA 100 4 10 0 11 0
ME 011 9 00 0 00 0
MD 100 6 10 0 10 0
MA 100 3 10 0 10 0
MI 000 6 10 0 11 1
MN 011 8 11 0 11 0
MS 011 9 11 0 11 0
MO 011 10 10 1 10 0
MT 111 10 00 0 11 0
NE 011 10 11 1 10 0
NV 100 4 11 0 01 0
NH 100 2 10 0 00 0
NJ 011 10 11 1 10 0
NM 011 10 11 1 11 0
NY 110 3 00 0 10 0
NC 011 10 00 0 01 0
ND 011 8 10 1 11 0
OH 011 10 10 1 11 1
OK 011 10 00 0 11 0
OR 011 8 10 0 11 1
PA 100 6 11 0 11 1
RI 011 10 11 0 00 0
SC 001 10 10 1 10 0
SD 011 10 11 1 11 1
TN 001 10 10 1 11 0
TX 111 8 10 0 11 1
UT 011 10 10 0 10 1
VT 010 0 00 0 00 0
VA 011 8 11 1 10 0
WA 011 8 10 0 11 1
WV 011 10 10 0 11 1
WI 000 6 11 0 11 1
WY 011 8 11 1 10 05T H E R E S U L T S 16
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5.1 Volatilities and Correlations
To begin with we examine whether basic, reduced form business cycle statistics are aﬀected by the
presence of ﬁscal restrictions. We summarize cyclical information through 9 statistics: the volatility
of state expenditure, the volatilities of state output, prices and employment in deviation from their
US counterpart; their correlation with per-capita real state consumption expenditure; the mean of
the log consumption expenditure to output ratio and the mean of per capita output.
There are several ways of computing volatilities and correlations. For example, in the business
cycle literature, it is common to ﬁlter out long and short frequencies ﬂuctuations and compute
statistics for ﬂuctuations which on average are between 2 to 6 years. In cross unit comparisons,
however, one has to worry about the fact that cycle length may diﬀer in diﬀerent units. In this
latter case, it is more typical to compute statistics using growth rates of the variables. Here we
present second moments obtained from the residuals of a VAR.
We prefer this approach for two reasons. First, given the short sample, the variability and
correlation properties at business cycle frequencies may be poorly estimated with ﬁltered data.
Second, with the scaling we employ, variables are stationary so moments can be computed without
any further transformation. Finally, by presenting results using the residuals of the VAR, we
account for predictable variations related to the presence of automatic stabilizers which may be
unaccounted for when using raw data.
Table 3 reports the p-values of two tests. The ﬁrst is an asymptotic χ2-test measuring the dif-
ferences, on average, in each of the statistics across groups of states with diﬀerent ﬁscal restrictions.
S i n c ew eh a v en i n ei n d i c a t o r so fﬁscal restrictions, diﬀerent rows report the results obtained with
diﬀerent classiﬁcations. The second is a nonparametric rank sum test, measuring the diﬀerence in
the distribution of each of the statistics across groups. Since with some classiﬁcations, the number
of units in each group is small; since critical values of such a test have been tabulated for groups
with as little as three units (see e.g. Hoel (1993)), and since the test examines the entire distribu-
tion, as opposed to the ﬁrst moment, it may be more reliable to evaluate the statistical signiﬁcance
of the diﬀerences.
The message of table 3 is very clear: the presence of tighter budget, debt, or institutional
restrictions does not appear to matter for business cycle ﬂuctuations. In fact, when an asymptotic
test is used, diﬀerences across groups are insigniﬁcant, regardless of the classiﬁcation employed to5T H E R E S U L T S 17
group states. When a small sample test is used, only price volatility is marginally statistically
diﬀerent across groups when the Supreme Court indicator is used.
Table 3: Volatilities and Correlations, VAR Residuals
Index Var(y)Var(n) Var(p) Var(g) Corr(y,g)Corr(n,g) Corr(p,g)
Asymptotic P-values of equality across groups
Ex-ante 0.89 0.81 0.94 0.74 0.88 0.93 0.97
Carryover 0.95 0.99 0.69 0.81 0.93 0.60 0.96
Ex-post 0.77 0.95 0.89 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.73
Debt 1 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.99 0.99
Debt 2 0.85 0.88 0.92 0.98 0.90 0.98 0.96
Short Debt 0.98 0.85 0.81 0.74 0.90 0.91 0.91
Veto 0.80 0.90 0.91 0.62 0.91 0.87 0.67
Supreme 0.91 0.99 0.77 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.97
Constitution 0.89 0.80 0.77 0.96 0.67 0.79 0.78
Rank test P-values of equality across groups
ex-ante 0.88 0.47 0.52 0.66 0.43 0.29 0.88
carry-over 0.34 0.43 0.21 0.81 0.96 0.81 0.85
ex-post 0.34 0.43 0.21 0.81 0.96 0.81 0.85
Debt 1 0.99 0.46 0.17 0.70 0.74 0.27 0.87
Debt 2 0.94 0.68 0.22 0.21 0.45 0.99 0.73
Short Debt 0.94 0.68 0.22 0.21 0.45 0.99 0.73
Veto 0.53 0.61 0.24 0.26 0.43 0.88 0.57
Supreme 0.83 0.14 0.06 0.50 0.12 0.95 0.60
Constitution 0.63 0.08 0.71 0.38 0.47 0.75 0.89
To provide visual content for this outcome we plot in Figure 1 the estimated values of the 9
statistics for each of the 48 states when we use the Ex-post indicator to group states. A vertical
b a ri ne a c hg r a p hc u t so ﬀ the 13 states with loose restrictions from those with strict ones. Two
features stand out from the ﬁgure. First, the mean diﬀerence in the statistics across groups is not
only statistically but also economically small. For example, average relative output volatility in
states with Ex-post restrictions is only marginally higher than the average volatility in states with
no Ex-post restrictions (0.03 versus 0.02 percent), but the opposite is true for relative employment
volatility. Second, there are considerable variations in the statistics within groups. For example,
the correlation between per-capita real consumption expenditure and relative output ranges from
- 0 . 3 8t o0 . 6 2i ns t a t e sw i t hl o o s eﬁscal restrictions and from -0.53 to 0.41 in states with strict budget
restrictions.
There are many reasons why the business cycle statistics we collected are statistically similar
across groups. One, often cited in the literature (see Milesi-Ferretti (2003)), is that state government
use creative accounting to avoid constraints when they become binding. For example, governments5T H E R E S U L T S 18
may shift expenditure items oﬀ-the-budget, or to less restricted branches (e.g. local governments),
or use stabilization funds to limit the revenue crunch they may experience in recessions. Similarly,
debt restrictions apply only to guaranteed debt. Hence, there is an incentive for state governments
to swap non-guaranteed (revenue) for guaranteed debt when the borrowing limit becomes binding.
Since our data includes both local and state expenditures and we consider total outstanding debt, we
can study whether ﬁscal restrictions constraint government behavior, or simply imply substitution




















































Figure 1: Moments using the Ex-post classiﬁcation
Table 4, which reports ﬁrst and second moments of the level of total state and local deﬁcits
and debt, of debt to output ratios and of the growth rate of non-guaranteed to guaranteed debt,
is consistent with the idea that more restricted governments tend to substitute across accounts to
avoid the restrictions. In fact, the mean deﬁcits appear to be diﬀerent in strongly restricted vs.
weakly restricted states only when the short term debt indicator is used and the rank test is used to
evaluate the diﬀerences while the debt to output ratio is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent only when the Debt2
indicator is used. Perhaps surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that the growth rate of non-guaranteed to5T H E R E S U L T S 19
guaranteed debt is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across groups of states with diﬀerent debt constraints.
While this appears to be in contrast with the substitution hypothesis, one should also notice that
both types of states have substantially increased the less unrestricted form of debt ﬁnancing over
time and this may account for our failure to detect diﬀerences.
Table 4: Means and Volatilities
Index Mean(df) Mean(Debt) Mean(Debt/Y) Mean(∆ NG/G) vol(df) vol(debt) vol(Debt/Y) vol(∆ NG/G)
Asymptotic test: P-values for the null of equality of means across groups
Ex-ante 0.85 0.85 0.99 0.88 0.58 0.69 0.52 0.68
Carryover 0.86 0.99 0.85 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.89 0.89
Ex-post 0.49 0.87 0.97 0.80 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.91
Debt 1 0.88 0.98 0.92 0.91 0.73 0.78 0.95 0.67
Debt 2 0.92 0.93 0.63 0.85 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.74
Short Debt 0.81 0.85 0.99 0.74 0.56 0.56 0.99 0.91
Veto 0.82 0.94 0.97 0.77 0.95 0.97 0.62 0.68
Supreme 0.83 0.99 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.93 0.97 0.76
Constitution 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.78 0.87 0.90 0.80 0.64
Rank sum test P-values for the null of equality of distributions across groups
Ex-ante 0.58 0.72 0.61 0.17 0.68 0.16 0.98 0.07
Carryover 0.96 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.11 0.98 0.87 0.76
Ex-post 0.51 0.05 0.88 0.81 0.96 0.27 0.79 0.53
Debt 1 0.55 0.03 0.66 0.83 0.40 0.36 0.91 0.97
Debt 2 0.29 0.77 0.03 0.96 0.68 0.94 0.43 0.31
Short Debt 0.03 0.66 0.82 0.94 0.62 0.29 0.94 0.01
Veto 0.24 0.79 0.97 0.46 0.97 0.12 0.66 0.08
Supreme 0.09 0.43 0.91 0.16 0.37 0.85 0.67 0.22
Constitution 0.59 0.45 0.86 0.82 0.22 0.75 0.80 0.87
A further piece of evidence on this issue comes from ﬁgure 2 where we plot the average (across
states) ratio of local to state expenditure over time. Three features deserve comments. First,
there has been a signiﬁcant trend increase in the expenditure of the less restricted branches of the
government in the 1990’s and this pattern is shared by states with strict and loose ﬁscal restrictions.
Second, states which are less restricted have local expenditure which is consistently smaller than
states where Ex-post restrictions are in place - on average about 15 percent. Third, both types
of states tend to resort to local expenditure more during periods of national wide recessions (see
1980-81 and 1990-91).
Overall, the evidence is supportive of the claim that tight ﬁscal restrictions have not produced,
on average, more virtuous governments and, as a consequence, have not altered the business cycle
properties of state variables. The conclusions is robust to the classiﬁcation used to deﬁne states5T H E R E S U L T S 20
with tight ﬁscal restrictions and, to a large extent, of the tests used to evaluate the mean diﬀerences
across groups and the statistics employed. We also argue that this outcome seems due to the fact
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Figure 2: Average Local to State Expenditure
While the evidence seems overwhelming, one important caveat needs to be mentioned: the
conclusions we have drawn are so far based on ”reduced form” statistics. Although volatilities and
correlations are unaﬀected by budget restrictions it is possible that the channels through which ﬁscal
policy shocks are transmitted to the state economy could be signiﬁcantly altered. In addition, tight
budget, debt, or institutional restrictions may imply diﬀerent ﬁscal rules. Since our VAR model can
exactly examine these issues, we next turn to a more structural evaluation of the macroeconomic
eﬀects of ﬁscal constraints.
5.2 The transmission of expenditure shocks
The identiﬁcation of structural expenditure shocks roughly produced the expected results. We
identify G disturbances in 36 states and BB disturbances in 12 states; in seven states (Connecticut,
Iowa, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia) we fail to recover any expenditure
shock and in seven states (Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, South Carolina, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia) we identify both G and BB shocks. We have already mentioned that, since our data
includes state and local consumption expenditure, and since expenditure switching practices seem5T H E R E S U L T S 21
to be widespread, shocks in states with strict constraints may end up looking like G shocks. We
ﬁnd that this is the case in 25 states. We also mentioned the possibility that states with no strict
budget requirement may nevertheless maintain close to a balance budget when manipulating the
discretionary component of expenditure. This seems to be the case in Maryland and Pennsylvania.
How is it that in some states both shocks are identiﬁed and in others no shocks satisfy the restrictions
we imposed? We conjecture that structural instability is responsible for both results. In fact, in
states were no expenditure shock is identiﬁed, the comovements of expenditure, deﬁcit and output
are poorly estimated. On the other hand, the seven states where both shocks are identiﬁed are
among the last to establish stabilization funds 5 and the variability of BB shocks in these states
declines considerably in the last 10 years of the sample.
We measure the transmission of expenditure shocks to the local economy for a ”typical” state
with strict, or loose budget restrictions using the one step methodology described in section 2.
We computed ”typical” responses grouping states with our nine indicators. Since conclusions are
broadly robust, we only present outcomes obtained using the Ex-post indicator and the Debt2
indicator. Figure 3 plots the mean response and a 68% conﬁdence band of relative output (ﬁrst
row), relative employment (second row) and relative prices (third row) following a G shock and
Figure 4 the same information following a BB shock when the Ex-post index is used. Figures 5
and 6 plot bands for the two types of shocks when the Debt2 indicator is used to classify states.
Consider Figure 3. Qualitatively speaking, the responses of the three variables to G shocks
conform with theoretical expectations: expansionary expenditure shocks boost aggregate demand
and increase, on average, relative employment in both groups of states. The pattern of relative
price responses is slightly diﬀerent across columns: in fact, relative prices rise instantaneously
when strict restrictions are in place while are instantaneously insigniﬁcant in states with loose
restrictions. However, in both cases responses are positive after two years and remain persistently
and signiﬁcantly above the trend for another 5 years.
A BB type disturbance, on average, signiﬁcantly decreases relative employment in both group of
states. Also this pattern conforms to theoretical expectations since an expenditure increase, when
ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation, is expected to have contractionary eﬀects on output. Relative
price movements are insigniﬁcant over the ﬁrst two years for both groups of states but then turn
positive and slightly diﬀerent from zero in states with strict deﬁcit restrictions.
5In Kansas stabilization funds were introduced in 1993, in Maryland in 1985, in Missisipi in 1982, in Utah in 1986,


































































Figure 3: Responses of Macroeconomic Variables, Ex-Post Classiﬁcation
The typical responses of output and employment to both shocks in the two groups are also
quantitatively similar. Take, for example, G shocks. Here the maximum diﬀerence in the output
and employment responses for the two groups are 0.12 and 0.06, respectively. But the mean response
of the two variables for the typical state with strict restrictions is inside the band obtained for the
typical state with loose restrictions and the bands for the two groups of states largely overlap.
Furthermore, the qualitative diﬀerence in relative price responses we have noted, washes out once
standard errors are accounted for.
Two other interesting features of ﬁgures 3 and 4 need to be emphasized. First, the timing of
the responses is largely unaltered by the presence of strict budget restrictions: the largest response
of relative output and relative employment is always instantaneous, while the response of relative
prices is slightly hump shaped. Second, the persistence of the responses also looks similar across
groups for both types of shocks. For example, the half-life of the output responses to G shocks is
about two years for both groups while it is one year for both groups with BB shocks.
Is there any possibility that, although statistically insigniﬁcant, diﬀerence across groups are5T H E R E S U L T S 23
economically relevant? Figures 3 and 4 are not very informative on this issue. For example,
comparing point estimates it looks as if cumulative one year output multipliers for both types
of shocks are about 20% larger in states with strict ﬁscal restrictions. However, any meaningful
attempt to explain this diﬀerence (for example, noting that large ﬁscal shocks are less likely to
occur when strict ﬁscal constraints are in place) comes against the fact that the uncertainty around

































































Figure 4: Responses of Macroeconomic Variables, Ex-Post Classiﬁcation
Figures 5 and 6 conﬁrm these conclusions. The only noticeable diﬀerence across states with
strict/ loose debt restrictions concerns the behavior of employment with BB shocks. In fact, it
appears that employment is better shielded from the adverse economic eﬀects of balance budget
shocks when loose debt constraints are in place. Also in this case, standard error bands largely

































































Figure 5: Responses of macroeconomic variables, Debt2 Classiﬁcation
To summarize, the transmission of ﬁscal disturbances to the real economy is both qualitatively
and quantitatively unaltered by the presence of strict budget, or debt constraints. Some qualitative
diﬀerence emerges when we look at relative price responses, but also in this case diﬀerences are
statistically insigniﬁcant. It is important to stress that not only the magnitude of the responses
but also their shape and their persistence are unchanged by the restrictions. Why is it that we fail
to ﬁnd diﬀerences across groups of states? Once again, part of the explanation has to do with the
fact that it is relatively easy to circumvent ﬁscal constraints. In fact, the response of deﬁcits to
G and BB shocks looks very similar across groups of states. Another part of the explanation has
to do with the fact that ﬂexible labor markets may compensate for the inﬂexibility of ﬁscal policy.
This ﬂexibility may be the crucial diﬀerence one should expect to encounter when trying to extend






























































Figure 6: Responses of macroeconomic variables, Debt2 Classiﬁcation
5.3 Fiscal rules
To analyze the systematic component of expenditure we compute the contemporaneous policy rules
implied by our structural VAR estimates for each group of states 6. We report in table 5 average
point estimates of the coeﬃcients on output, employment, prices and debt/output ratio for each of
the indicators used to group states. For interpretation purposes coeﬃcients are normalized so that
expenditure appears on the left hand side with a unitary coeﬃcient.
Several interesting features emerge from the table. First, it appears that diﬀerent type of shocks
imply diﬀerent expenditure rules. With G shocks, expenditure is generally leaning against relative
output, relative employment and debt while it is roughly unresponsive to relative prices. When BB
shocks are considered, expenditure follows relative output, leans against relative price movements
and is roughly unresponsive to the other two variables.
Second, while there are some changes in the sign of the output coeﬃcient across classiﬁcations,
in many cases, only magnitude diﬀerences are present. For example, for G shocks, expenditure
6This is achieved computing the policy rule for each state, given the identiﬁcation scheme. The policy rule for a
typical state of each group is calculated weigthing each state’s coeﬃcients by their standard deviations as described
in section 2.5T H E R E S U L T S 26
is always leaning against relative output movements when loose restrictions are in place and it is
following relative output movements when strict restrictions are in place only with the three debt
Table 5: Government expenditure rules
Index Output PricesEmployment Debt
G Shocks
Ex-ante loose restrictions -0.24 0.93 -2.41 -0.12
strict restrictions -0.21 0.00 -0.12 -0.82
Carry-over loose restrictions -0.14 -0.03 -0.03 -0.23
strict restrictions -0.31 1.25 -3.20 -0.45
Ex-post loose restrictions -0.16 0.01 -0.08 -0.47
strict restrictions -0.38 2.21 -5.53 -0.03
Debt 1 loose restrictions -3.70 10.64 2.94 -2.82
strict restrictions 0.16 -0.52 -2.21 -0.06
Debt 2 loose restrictions -1.92 1.83 0.16 -0.59
strict restrictions 1.80 -0.81 -3.88 -0.05
Short Debt loose restrictions -0.24 0.57 -1.01 -0.26
strict restrictions 1.81 -0.81 -3.76 -0.05
Veto loose restrictions -0.08 0.003 -0.06 -0.06
strict restrictions -0.41 1.38 -3.59 -0.68
Court loose restrictions -0.12 -2.75 0.43 0.73
strict restrictions -0.20 -0.30 -1.09 -0.05
Constitution loose restrictions -0.32 -1.15 0.43 0.73
strict restrictions -0.28 -0.88 0.09 0.18
BB Shocks
Ex-ante loose restrictions 4.92 -5.42 0.05 0.10
strict restrictions 8.29 -0.15 -6.13 -0.47
Carry-over loose restrictions 17.42 0.29 -8.98 -1.11
strict restrictions 5.48 -4.64 -0.40 0.14
Ex-post loose restrictions 19.94 -0.41 -15.09 -1.41
strict restrictions 3.88 -4.25 0.03 0.11
Debt 1 loose restrictions 0.15 0.01 -0.01 0.16
strict restrictions 7.34 -4.64 -2.38 -0.13
Debt 2 loose restrictions 8.09 -3.58 -2.48 -0.01
strict restrictions 2.55 -4.02 -1.03 -0.19
Short Debt loose restrictions 8.32 -0.00 -3.52 -0.12
strict restrictions 0.36 -12.74 1.85 0.03
Veto loose restrictions 5.97 -3.75 -1.93 -0.08
strict restrictions -0.12 -2.75 0.43 0.73
Court loose restrictions 7.34 -8.88 1.71 -0.19
strict restrictions 5.06 -0.34 -4.36 -0.00
Constitution loose restrictions 1.32 -0.69 -0.12 -0.06
strict restrictions 2.28 -0.93 -0.61 -0.18
classiﬁcations. Expenditure also follows relative output movements for both groups of states when
BB shocks are considered with eight of the nine indicators and it is only with the Veto indicator5T H E R E S U L T S 27
that strict restrictions imply countercyclical responses.
Third, the signs of employment and price coeﬃcients depend, to a large extent, on the clas-
siﬁcation used and the magnitude of variations is considerable. For example, with G shocks the
average relative price coeﬃcient for states with loose restrictions runs from -2.75 to 10.64 and the
one for states with strict restrictions runs from -0.81 to 2.21.
Fourth, expenditure systematically responds in a stabilizing fashion to debt/output ratio in
both groups of states when G shocks are examined with all but one indicator. The magnitude of
the average estimated elasticity ranges from 0.05 to a large 2.82, and it is not necessarily true that
states with strict ﬁscal rules react diﬀerently, on average, to debt. A more mixed pattern instead
emerges when BB shocks are considered: the signs change across classiﬁcations in a somewhat
unpredictable manner and no pattern is detectable.
But perhaps more importantly, regardless of the classiﬁcation used to group states and of the
type of shocks considered, and even in those cases when sign switches are present, diﬀerences
across groups of states are statistically insigniﬁcant. This is true both when average coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and when they are not and occurs because policy rules within
groups are very heterogeneous. As an illustration, take the Ex-post classiﬁcation. There average
relative prices and relative employment coeﬃcients are equal to -0.08 and 0.01 respectively, (with
standard errors equal to 1.82 and 1.32) when no restrictions are in place, implying, for example, that
a one percent movement in state employment above the national level makes per-capita expenditure
fall by less than 0.1 percent. Expenditure becomes strongly countercyclical with respect to relative
employment movements and turns procyclical with respect to relative prices movements, on average
when restrictions are in place (coeﬃcients are -5.53 and 2.21, respectively). However, standard
errors are large also in this case (equal to 2.70 and 1.61, respectively) making conﬁdence bands
around the mean largely overlap.
What does the large heterogeneity within group tell us about ﬁscal rules? It appears that
deﬁcit, debt and political restrictions only marginally account for the diﬀerences in expenditure
responses to business cycle conditions across states. To put this result in another way, the R2 in a
typical two-stage regression where ﬁscal dummies are used to explain diﬀerences in the ﬁrst stage
slope estimates is negligible. This suggest that other state characteristics (e.g. their location, the
composition of output, or the trade pattern with neighboring states) could be more important to
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6 Comparing our results to the literature
Our results diﬀer from some of those present in the literature. Therefore, it is important to highlight
the reasons which may account for the diﬀerences. As mentioned the more structural part of our
analysis is novel and no comparison with the literature is available. For the reduced form analysis,
one should also remember that the extent of the overlap is limited, since the literature has not
focused on volatilities and correlations.
For the latter type of analysis, there is one econometric reason, already mentioned in section 2,
which may account for the diﬀerences: we use one-step estimators while the literature has employed
two-steps estimators for models like those in equations (1)-(2). Since our estimators are consistent
in a variety of circumstances and eﬃciently account for uncertainty in the ﬁrst stage estimates, the
signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence found in the literature across groups of states could be artiﬁcial.
There are two other reasons which may help to understand why our results are diﬀerent: the
treatment of aggregate cycles and that of dynamic heterogeneities.
All our results are obtained scaling state macroeconomic variables by their US average since
this allows us to explicitly account for ﬂuctuations which are nationwide in nature. Such a scaling
is not typically employed in the literature and the list of economy wide variables used to control for
these factors is either short, or inexistent. Hence, what appeared as diﬀerent economic relationships
in states with strict, or loose ﬁscal restrictions could be biases induced by the omission of eﬀective
controls for economy wide business cycles.
We have also mentioned in section 2, the need to control for dynamic heterogeneity in the
analysis. It is often argued that US states are relatively homogeneous and that ﬁxed eﬀects suﬃce
to account for the diﬀerences. To show that this is far from being the case, we computed output
volatility separately pooling data for states with and without Ex-post restrictions. A test for
the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in the two groups has now a p-value of 0.04 (as opposed to
0.77 as reported in table 4), suggesting that dynamic heterogeneities within each group of states
are very important. Since failure to take dynamic heterogeneities into account causes biases and
inconsistencies, diﬀerences between our results and those presented in the literature can also be
due to the poor properties of the estimators others have used.7C O N C L U S I O N S 29
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzed whether tight ﬁscal constraints aﬀect the macroeconomic performance of 48
US states for the period 1969-1995. First, we studied the volatility and the comovements of a
number of state variables. In each case we constructed a mean estimator for groups of states with
diﬀerent ﬁscal constraints and evaluated the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences.
Second, we examined the diﬀerences in the transmission properties of expenditure disturbances
ﬁnanced by debt, or by distortionary taxation for a typical state with, or without ﬁscal restrictions.
Finally, we backed out expenditure rules (one for each of the two shocks) for states with loose and
strict restrictions and compared them.
We ﬁnd that the macroeconomic consequences of ﬁscal constraints have been overemphasized.
While the sign and the magnitude of point estimates are, at times, diﬀerent, these diﬀerences are
statistically insigniﬁcant and economically unimportant. Our conclusions are robust in a number of
dimensions, and in particular, do not depend on the way we deﬁne ”loose”, or ”strict”, on whether
deﬁcit, debt, or institutional constraints are in place, on the type of statistical tests we employ and,
to a large extent, on the statistics we consider.
We argue that the main reason for why ﬁscal constraints make so little diﬀerence for macroe-
conomic ﬂuctuations is the ability of state governments to work around the rules and transfer
expenditure items to either less restricted accounts, or to less constrained portions of the govern-
ment. In addition, the presence of rainy days funds eﬀectively allows to limit current expenditure
cuts at times when the constraints become binding. Given that constraints apply only to a portion
of the total budget, that no formal provision for the enforcement of the constraints exist and that
rainy days funds play a buﬀer-stock role, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that tight ﬁscal constraints do
not statistically alter the magnitude and the nature of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
Our results have important implications for the design of ﬁscal restrictions. If constraints are
imposed to keep government behavior under control, tight restrictions may be the wrong way to go,
since they simply imply more creative accounting practices, unless they come together with clearly
stated and easily veriﬁable enforcement requirements. That is to say, tight ﬁscal constraints are
neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition for good government performance. On the other hand,
if constraints are imposed to reduce default probabilities, or to limit the eﬀects that local spending
has on average area wide inﬂation, and given that their negative macroeconomic eﬀects appear to
be marginal, tight constraints with some carefully selected escape route could be preferable.7C O N C L U S I O N S 30
Although it is tempting to do so, we should warn the reader against using the evidence to draw
conclusions about the reform of the SGP. And we would like to do this despite the fact that Canova
and Pappa (2003) have shown that the response of macroeconomic variables to ﬁscal shocks in
the two monetary unions share a number of important similarities. Three reasons motivate our
concerns. First, labor markets in the US are suﬃciently ﬂexible, people move and other margins
(such as relative prices) adjust to absorb macroeconomic shocks. Europe is diﬀerent in this respect
and the imposition of tighter ﬁscal restrictions in the EMU may have completely diﬀerent eﬀects.
Second, since ﬁscal constraints in the US almost always exclude capital account expenditures, the
conclusions we reach are not necessarily applicable to situations like EMU where non-golden rule
type of constraints are in place. Third, social security, medical and welfare expenditures constitute
the largest portion of current account expenditure of European countries, while they are a tiny
portion of expenditure of US states. Furthermore, we would like to underscore that none of our
conclusions implies the abandonment of some kind of legislated ﬁscal restraint and that ﬁscal
constraints can have beneﬁcial distributional and long run eﬀects.7C O N C L U S I O N S 31
Appendix A: Data sources and deﬁnitions
US data are annual from 1969 to 1995, real, seasonally adjusted and per capita. U.S. Census
Bureau is the source unless it is otherwise indicated.
State Population: total state population in thousands.
Gross state product (in constant 1982 prices): Obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) from 1977; before 1977 we used the series from Oved Yosha’s US State-Level Macroeconomic
Databank (www.tau.ac.il/yosha ).
State revenue: total state and local revenue.
State expenditure: Direct expenditure - capital outlays. Direct expenditure measures all expen-
ditures other than intergovernmental expenditures. It includes both state and local expenditures
and covers all funds available to the state government.
State debt: total state and local debt outstanding at the end of the ﬁscal year. It includes short
term debt and long run guaranteed and non-guaranteed (revenue bonds) debt. The decomposition
of long run total debt into two components is available only from 1977.
State employment: total full and part time state and local employment (from BLS).






it denotes the price level in rural areas of state i and comes from
the Monthly Labor Review data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (after 1978) and the ”cost of
living for intermediate level budget” from the same source (before 1978). wu
i measures the fraction
of population living in rural areas of state i and comes from the Statistical Abstract of the US.
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it is the CPI in metropolitan
area k obtained from the ACCRA (American Chamber of Commerce Realtors Association) and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on CPI for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and CPI by Regions and
by Urban Population and ωk
i is the percentage of urban population living in metropolitan area k
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis site. PB
it is the CPI in other urban areas taken
from the Monthly Labor Review data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. State CPI is normalized
so that in each year their population average coincides with the US CPI.
Federal Aid Total: total aid provided to local and state governments by the Federal Govern-
ment.
State GSP Deﬂators: Computed from real and nominal state GSP data (from BEA).
US aggregate data for real GDP, interest rates, CPI and oil prices come from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis FREDII data bank. Data on aggregate population and federal aid to comes from
the US Census.8 REFERENCES 32
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